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American Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters: Green Light to
Territorial Security for Automobile Dealers
Motor vehicle dealers, through extensive lobbying efforts, 1 have obtained an
arsenal of statutory weapons to defend against manufacturers' abuses of the
franchise system. 2 In North Carolina, the dealers' main weapon is the Motor
Vehicle Dealers and Manufacturers Licensing Law, 3 which includes a provision
regulating establishment of new franchises in the trade area of an existing
franchise that distributes the same line-make of motor vehicles for the manufac-

turer.4 In a recent case, American Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters,5 a manufacturer
argued that giving such territorial security to a dealer created a monopoly 6 in
violation of the North Carolina Constitution. 7 The North Carolina Supreme
Court, however, held the statutory provision constitutional. 8 That finding,9

along with recent amendments to North Carolina General Statutes section 20305(5), firmly established North Carolina dealers' sovereignty within their trade
areas-to the detriment of the average car buyer. 10

James Pennell had maintained a Jeep franchise from American Motors
Corporation (AMC) in the North Wilkesboro market area since 1960.11 Even
though Pennell failed for several years to sell the quota that AMC desired, 12 in
1976 AMC granted Pennell a five-year extension on his franchise. 13 In the
1. Automobile dealers possess a great deal of political power in the state legislatures. Macaulay, Law and Society: Changinga Continuing RelationshipBetween a Large Corporation and Those
Who Deal With It Automobile Manufacturers, TheirDealers, and the Legal System, 1965 Wis. L.
REv. 483, 516; Smith, FranchiseRegulation: An Economic Analysis of State Restrictionson Automobile Distribution, 25 J. LAW & ECON. 125, 154 (1982). "Often several legislators are automobile
dealers. Dealers often are active in local and state politics and have close ties with legislators and
party leaders. Finally,. . . it costs the legislators little if anything to give benefits to the dealers
since the large automobile manufacturers have little influence." Macaulay, supra, at 522.
2. This arsenal includes licensing of manufacturers and restrictions on manufacturer-dealer
relations. Smith, supra note 1, at 133. See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text (listing various
types of provisions found in state statutes); Note, State Motor Vehicle FranchiseLegislation: A Survey andDue Process Challenge to Board Composition, 33 VAND. L. Rrv. 385 (1980) (tracing the rise
of the franchise as the primary automobile distribution device).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-285 to -308.2 (1983).
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-305 makes it unlawful for "any manufacturer, factory branch, distributor, or distributor branch, or any field representative, officer, agent, or any representative whatsoever of any of them" to engage in certain enumerated conduct. See infra notes 102-122 and
accompanying text.
5. 311 N.C. 311, 317 S.E.2d 351 (1984).
6. "Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state and shall not be
allowed." N.C. CoNsr. art. I, § 34.
7. Peters, 311 N.C. at 315, 317 S.E.2d at 355.
8. Id. at 324, 317 S.E.2d at 360.
9. The court held the statute constitutional both on its face and as applied to the facts. Id.
10. See infra note 123.
11. American Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters, 58 N.C. App. 684, 685, 294 S.E.2d 764, 765 (1982),
affl'd in part, 311 N.C. 316, 317 S.E.2d 351 (1984). The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles found that
the "North Wilkesboro Market Area" included "Wilkes County in its entirety and portions of Surry
and Alleghany Counties." Peters, 311 N.C. at 316, 317 S.E.2d at 356.
The amended version of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 305(5) (1983) specifically limits the size of the area
that can be labelled market area. See infra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
12. American Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters, 58 N.C. App. at 685, 294 S.E.2d at 765.
13. Id. Pennell argued in his appellate brief that because N.C. GEN. STAT. § 305(6) (1983)
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midst of this extension period, AMC granted an additional Jeep franchise in the
North Wilkesboro Market Area to Hubert Vickers. 14 Pennell then requested a

hearing with the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles pursuant to section 20305(5).15 The Commissioner conducted the hearing in March 1981 and ordered
that Vickers' franchise "be enjoined, invalidated, and revoked" 16 and that AMC
"be enjoined from granting Jeep franchises in the North Wilkesboro area without first complying with the procedure set forth in G.S. 20-305(5)."17 After a
series of procedural steps in superior court, 18 AMC and Vickers sought review

before the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
On appeal AMC and Vickers raised three principal issues. First, AMC
contended the Commissioner did not have the authority to issue an injunction. 19

Second, AMC argued that section 305(5) was unconstitutional on its face because it allowed monopolies. 20 Last, AMC said section 20-305(5) was unconsti-

tutional "as applied in this case because it granted a monopoly to Pennell."'21

The court of appeals held against the petitioners on each issue. 22 The court
noted that AMC could give Pennell an exclusive right to sell Jeeps in the North
Wilkesboro trade area without violating the antimonopoly section of the North

Carolina Constitution; the general assembly was not granting a monopoly by
severely restricts a manufacturer's ability to terminate a dealer, the manufacturer may find it easier
to establish a new franchise in the same market area. "Thus, the legislature enacted G.S. 305(5) to
prevent the distributor from doing indirectly what G.S. 305(6) prevents him from doing directly."
Brief for Respondent at 6-7. See also Forest Home Dodge, Inc. v. Karns, 29 Wis. 2d 78, 138
N.W.2d 214 (1965) (court examined legislative history of a statute similar to N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 305(5) (1983) and stated that "it was designed to prevent the manufacturer from accomplishing by
new.. . dealerships what the law did not permit to be done directly"); S. MACAULAY, LAW AND
THE BALANCE OF POwER: THE AUToMoBILE MANUFACTURERS AND THEIR DEALERS 139 (1966)

("if a dealer could not be cancelled, he could be induced . . .to... resign his franchise 'voluntarily' by adding another dealer").
14. American Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters, 58 N.C. App. at 685, 294 S.E.2d at 765.
15. Id.; see supra note 4.
16. American Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters, 58 N.C. App. at 685, 294 S.E.2d at 765-66
17. Id. at 685, 294 S.E.2d at 766.
18. The procedural aspects of this part of the case are rather involved. AMC and Vickers
petitioned for judicial review in superior court pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-43 (1983).
Superior Court Judge Bailey affirmed the Commissioner's conclusions solely because the required
written notice was not given. Peters, 311 N.C. at 314, 317 S.E.2d at 354-55. AMC and Vickers then
appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, AMC and Vickers petitioned the
Wake County Superior Court for an ex parte stay of the Commissioner's order pending judicial
review. Id. at 314, 317 S.E.2d at 355. Judge Godwin stayed the order in March 1981. Id. Pennell
intervened and prayed that the stay be lifted. Id. In April 1981 after a hearing, Judge Hobgood
concluded that Judge Godwin's exparte order had expired in March 1981 and denied a motion to
continue the stay. Id. AMC and Vickers also appealed this ruling to the North Carolina Court of
Appeals, and the two appeals were consolidated. Id.
19. American Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters, 58 N.C. App. at 688, 294 S.E.2d at 767.
20. Id.
21. Id. The petitioners could have argued that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 305(5) (1983) violated the
Sherman Act, the commerce clause, or the police powers clause. These arguments, however, probably would have been rejected on the basis of prior decisions. See infra notes 67-72 & 79-81 and
accompanying text.
22. Regarding the Commissioner's power to grant an injunction, the court said:
We find no merit in this argument because we do not believe the Commissioner issued an
injunction. It is true that in the decretal portion of his order, he used the word "enjoin."
The order was not treated by any of the parties as an injunction, but as an order revoking
the franchising agreement.
American Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters, 58 N.C. App. at 688, 294 S.E.2d at 767.
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requiring AMC "to do what it could bargain to do if it desires to execute a
contract."'23 Judge Martin dissented, pointing out that the Georgia Supreme
Court 24 found that a similar statute violated the Georgia Constitution's prohibi25
tion against monopolies.
The North Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that
section 20-305(5) did not violate the prohibition against monopolies but disagreed with the court of appeals' conclusion that the Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles had not issued an injunction. 26 The court reasoned that the statute was
constitutional as applied to the facts of Peters because the restraint of intrabrand
competition does not constitute a monopoly. 27 The court stated that "many
consumers in the North Wilkesboro Market Area may, in fact, be geographically
closer to a Jeep dealer other than Pennell."128 Jeep franchises in contiguous
counties, the court noted, could compete with one another for consumers who
29
live near the boundaries of the trade area.
30
The court also ruled that section 20-305(5) was constitutional on its face,
3
1
rejecting petitioners' claim that it created and perpetuated monopolies.
The
court quoted a 1974 decision in distinguishing horizontal from vertical restraints
32
of trade:
The vertical agreement is one running from the producer down
through the distributor to the ultimate retailer. The horizontal agreement is one made between dealers at the same level. The horizontal
23. Id. at 688-89, 294 S.E.2d at 767.
24. Georgia Franchise Practices v. Massey-Ferguson, 244 Ga. 800, 262 S.E.2d 106 (1979). See
infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
25. American Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters, 58 N.C. App. at 690-91,294 S.E.2d at 768 (Martin,
J., dissenting).
26. Peters, 311 N.C. at 322-23, 317 S.E.2d at 355. The court of appeals had sustained the
commissioner's order "enjoining" AMC's grant of a franchise to Vicker on grounds that the commissioner had not issued an injunction in violation of the statute but had merely used this language
"inartfully." Id. at 322, 317 S.E.2d at 355. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that "insofar as
the Commissioner's order revoked. . . the franchise. . . it was within the Commission's statutorily
delegated powers. Insofar as the order enjoined future practices of American Motors or Vickers, the
order exceed[ed] the Commissioner's authority." Id. at 323, 317 S.E.2d at 360.
27. Id. at 317-18, 317 S.E.2d at 356.
28. Id.
29. Id. The court conceded that
prohibiting additional franchises amounts to a restraint of trade. But the restraint of intrabrand trade contemplated by the statute in question is not such as to amount to the creation of a monopoly. While competition may not be as full and free as with multiple AMC
Jeep franchises existing in the North Wilkesboro Market Area, it is by no means eliminated. More than a mere adverse effect on competition must arise before a restraint of
trade becomes monopolistic.
Id. (citations omitted).
30. Id. at 317-18, 317 S.E.2d at 357.
31. Petitioners argued:
Certainly, application of G.S. Sec. 20-305(5), in such a fashion as to permit an obviously
inefficient dealership to continue operation without competition cannot pass constitutional
muster under Article I, Sec. 34 of the State Constitution. Surely, it is not in the public
interest and public welfare for a dealership like Pennell Motor Company to operate as a
monopoly.
Brief for Petitioner at 8.
32. Peters, 311 N.C. at 318, 317 S.E.2d at 357 (citing Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distrib. of
North Wilkesboro, Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 206 S.E.2d 141 (1974)).
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agreement is deemed contrary to the public interest because it stifles
competition, whereas the vertical agreement is thought to leave to the
public the 33benefit of competition at a given level of the marketing
procedure.
The court concluded that horizontal restraints "impede competition and lead
inexorably to increased prices,. . . the evil which the anti-monopoly provision
seeks to prevent."'34 Vertical restraints are not viewed as offensive because they
do not prevent competition among dealers. 35 The court distinguished two earlier decisions, 36 which had held that certain licensing requirements violated the
38
antimonopoly clause, 37 as involving horizontal restraints on trade.
After establishing that the statute was a vertical and thus legitimate restraint on trade, the court discussed the particular policy favoring protection of
dealers. The court noted that manufacturers occupy a dominant position when
bargaining with their franchisees. 39 To correct this imbalance, state legislatures
have enacted statutes to protect dealers. 4° The court concluded that this legisla33. Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distrib. of North Wilkesboro, Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 480, 206
S.E.2d 141, 150 (1974).
The court apparently analogized the constitutional prohibition against monopolies to antitrust
law, quoting from United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), which applied the Sherman Act to
vertical trade restraints. Peters, 311 N.C. at 320, 317 S.E.2d at 358; see also Continental T.V., Inc. v.
G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (announcing a "rule of reason" when applying the Sherman Act to vertical restraints). For a thorough discussion of the Sherman Act and vertical territorial restraints, see L. SULLIvAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrrRUST 413-19 (1977); Aycock,
North CarolinaLaw on Antitrust and Consumer Protection, 60 N.C.L. REv. 207 (1982); Note, Antitrust-Vertical TerritorialRestrictions Judged Under Rule of Reason, 12 TUL. L. REv. 389 (1978).
To complete the analogy, the court could have discussed Waldron Buick Co. v. General Motors
Corp., 254 N.C. 117, 118 S.E.2d 559 (1961). In Waldron, the court held that an exclusive franchise
agreement between General Motors and a franchisee did not violate North Carolina's version of the
Sherman Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1 (1981), as an unreasonable restraint on trade. Waldron, 254
N.C. at 129, 118 S.E.2d at 568.
Automobile manufacturers in several jurisdictions have challenged statutes such as N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 305(5) (1983) as violating the antitrust laws. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
34. Peters, 311 N.C. at 318, 317 S.E.2d at 357.
35. Id.
36. In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 729 (1973); State
v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949).
37. InIn re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 729 (1973), the
court held that a statute regulating the construction of a private hospital on private property was
unconstitutional. Id. at 548, 193 S.E.2d at 733. The court was primarily concerned with containing
medical costs. Id. at 549, 193 S.E.2d at 734. In State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731
(1949), the court struck down as unconstitutional a licensing statute for photographers. Id. at 772,
51 S.E.2d at 736.
38. Peters, 311 N.C. at 320, 317 S.E.2d at 358. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
39. Id. at 319, 317 S.E.2d at 358. This imbalance in bargaining power has been noted often.
See, ag., Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66 YALE L.J.
1135, 1140 (1957) ("[O]ften the dealer must comply simply because of economic power of the manufacturer."); Macaulay, supra note 1, at 492-95 (dealer has "relatively little to bargain with"); Smith,
supranote 1, at 131-32 (noting that manufacturers have greater bargaining power); Strand & French,
The Automobile DealerFranchiseAct: Another Experiment in Federal Class Legislation, 25 GEO.
WAsH. L. REv. 667, 667-70 (1957) (dealer franchise system described as one in which the manufacturer maintains all control); see also New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox, Co., 439 U.S. 96, 10001 (1978) (discussing due process aspects of territorial security statutes); Mazda Motors of Am., Inc.
v. Southwestern Motors, Inc., 36 N.C. App. 1, 243 S.E.2d 793 (1978) (determining whether termination of franchise agreement violated statute), modified on other grounds, 296 N.C. 359, 250 S.E.2d
250 (1979); infra note 46 (discussing the superior bargaining power of automobile manufacturers).
40. "Currently, every state regulates at least some aspect of the distribution." Smith, supra
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tive response to the unequal bargaining power was a "valid exercise of the state's
extensive police power;"' 41 section 20-305(5) protects the "franchisees from

abuses of vertical integration." 42
The Peters court chose not to follow the Georgia Supreme Court, which
struck down a similar statute;4 3 the court noted that Georgia's constitution not

only prohibited monopolies, but also prohibited legislation that would diminish
competition. 44 In holding section 20-305(5) constitutional, the North Carolina
Supreme Court aligned itself with the majority of other jurisdictions. 45
Abusive tactics employed by automobile manufacturers after World War II
resulted in state and federal legislation to protect motor vehicle dealers. 46 In
note 1, at 133. "Of the fifty states, all but five have legislation that focuses directly upon the automobile manufacturer-dealer relationship." Note, supra note 2, at 399.
41. Peters, 311 N.C. at 320, 317 S.E.2d at 358. Accord Willys Motors, Inc. v. Northwest Kaiser-Willys, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 469 (D. Minn. 1956); Tober Foreign Motors, Inc. v. Reiter Oldsmobiles, Inc., 376 Mass. 313, 381 N.E.2d 908 (1978). Contra Georgia Franchise Practices Comm'n
v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 244 Ga. 800, 262 S.E.2d 106 (1979); General GMC Trucks, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 239 Ga. 373, 237 S.E.2d 194 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 996 (1977). See infra
note 61 and accompanying text.
42. Peters, 311 N.C. at 321, 317 S.E.2d at 359. The introductory paragraph to the Motor
Vehicle Dealers and Manufacturers Licensing Law states:
The General Assembly finds and declares that the distribution of motor vehicles in the
State of North Carolina vitally affects the general economy of the State and the public
interest and public welfare, and in the exercise of its police power, it is necessary to regulate
and license motor vehicle manufacturers, distributors, dealers, salesmen, and their representatives doing business in North Carolina, in order to prevent frauds, impositions and
other abuses upon its citizens and to protect and preserve the investments and priorities of
the citizens of this State.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-285 (1983). If the public interest is so in need of protection, why are dealers
the only parties who can object to a manufacturer's actions under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 305(5) (1983)?
The court in Tober Motors, Inc. v. Reiter Oldsmobiles, Inc., 376 Mass. 313, 381 N.E.2d 908 (1978),
in distinguishing the statute at issue there from that in General GMC Trucks, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 239 Ga. 373, 237 S.E.2d 194 (1977), stated: "These cases can be distinguished on the
ground that the laws seemed to make harm to existing dealers the only relevant criterion for judging
the propriety of a new franchise, a feature giving an anti-competitive cast to the statutes." Id. at
324, 381 N.E.2d at 913 (emphasis added). See infra notes 50 & 94 and accompanying text.
43. Peters, 311 N.C. at 321, 317 S.E.2d at 359; see supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
44. Peters, 311 N.C. at 321, 317 S.E.2d at 359. The court stated: "We decline to follow Georgia Franchise, noting that the Georgia constitutional provision, unlike its North Carolina counterpart, concerns legislation having 'the effect. . . of defeating or lessening competition. . .' as well as
'encouraging a monopoly.' Thus, its scope seems considerably more far-reaching into the area of
commerce than our anti-monopoly provision." Id.
45. See infra notes 60-61, 66 and accompanying text.
46. S. MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BALANCE OF POWER: THE AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS AND THEIR DEALERS 16-19 (1966). By the 1950s, supply caught up with demand in the auto
industry.
During this period all manufacturers sought to induce dealers to sell more cars ....
Promotions [for factory representatives] came to those who produced sales, and the more
the dealers were pushed, the more they sold . . . . Some dealers flourished. Some quit.
Others were cancelled by the factory or pushed into involuntary "voluntary" termination.
Id. at 16-19. It has been well-documented that manufacturers abused their superior bargaining
power over dealers. See Macaulay, supra note 1, at 495-506; Strand & French, supra note 39, at 66870. Manufacturers' power over dealers stems from the system of distribution.
[Tihe dealer pays for much of the distribution system in the automobile industry, and his
money rather than the manufacturer's is tied up in bricks and mortar, and, more importantly, in unsold new automobiles. . . . The selling agreement is drafted by the manufacturer's lawyers in fairly legal language and accepted without change by the dealer. ...
Typically, the manufacturer gets what it wants from its dealers. It often has more applicants who would like to be dealers than it has dealerships available.. . . A dealer is in a
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1956 Congress enacted the Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act,47 which gave

dealers a federal cause of action against manufacturers who did not act in "good
faith." 48 The Act did not protect dealers' territorial security, despite lobbying
49
by the National Association of Automobile Dealers for such a provision.

very bad position if his franchise is terminated. Upon termination it is difficult to salvage
his large investment because a cancelled dealer has difficulty selling his building, tools,
inventory, and good will to another dealer.
Macaulay, supra note 1, at 489-95. Smith proposes an alternative hypothesis:
[F]ranchising is used by the industry because it provides a balance of retail incentives and
effective control which is favorable to the manufacturer. This alsertion differs from earlier
explanations of the use of franchising by the auto industry, most of which regard the
franchise system as a mechanism for raising capital quickly. Such explanations are not
sufficient since they fail to explain why alternative systems of organization do not arise
once the alleged capital shortage problem is solved.
Smith, supra note 1, at 126.
47. Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act, ch. 1038, 70 Stat. 1125 (1956) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1976)). This Act was the keystone of later state and federal legislation.
Mhe act provides legal remedies for dealers harmed by the actions of manufacturers which
are not ingood faith. . . . While a few states had enacted statutes pertaining to regulation of automobile distribution as early as the 1930's and 1940's, most of them did not
substantially strengthen the legal rights of dealers. Since the 1956 Dealers' Day in Court
Act, state regulation of automobile distributors has undergone significant changes.
Smith, supra note 1, at 132-33.
The Morroney Committee, a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, studied automobile distribution. Three of the committee members were closely linked
with automobile dealers: Senator Paine was a former dealer; Senator Monroney's college roommate
was a General Motors dealer; and Senator Thurmond served in the Army Reserve with the legislative counsel for the National Automobile Dealers' Association. S. MACAULAY, supra note 46, at 4850.
The bill was amended significantly. For a description of the legislative history of the Act, see
Kessler, supra note 39.
48. The statute provides:
An automobile dealer may bring suit against any automobile manufacturer. . . and shall
recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit by reason of the failure of
said automobile manufacturer. . . to act in good faith in performing.. . with any of the
terms or provisions of the franchise, or in terminating, cancelling, or not renewing the
franchise with said dealer ....
15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1976).
49. The Eisenhower administration opposed a territorial security provision.
William P. Rogers, Deputy Attorney General, wrote Senator O'Mahoney about the Eisenhower Administration's views on. . .the good faith bills. In short, he said that the Administration did not like them. While it had no strong objection to legislation dealing with
coercion, it opposed any legislative authorization for "territorial security" . . . because
such [provision] would protect franchised dealers at the cost of denying consumers the
benefits of competition. . . . These comments were consistent with the antitrust philosophy of the Department of Justice. Conveniently, they also pleased Ford and General Motors whose officers were supporters of the Eisenhower campaign for re-election.
S. MACAULAY, supra note 46, at 62-63.
Some dealers apparently opposed territorial protections. Strand & French, supra note 39, at
675. See also Macaulay, Law and Society: Changinga Continuing Relationship Between a Large
Corporationand Those Who Deal With It: Automobile Manufacturers, TheirDealers, and the Legal
System-PartII, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 704, 846 (describing the disagreement among auto dealers over
territorial security). The House Report on the Dealers' Day in Court Act states:
The bill does not freeze present channels or methods of automobile distribution and would
not prohibit a manufacturer from appointing an additional dealer in a community provided
that the establishment of the new dealer is not a device by the manufacturer to coerce or
intimidate an existing dealer. The committee emphasizes that the bill does not afford the
dealer the right to be free from competition from additional franchise dealers. Appointment of added dealers in an area is a normal competitive method for securing better distri-

1086

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

The state legislative schemes protecting dealers vary widely and may contain, along with legislative findings and declarations, 50 provisions for licensing, 1
provisions for boards and commissions, 52 restrictions on franchise termination,5 3 restrictions on franchise establishment,5 4 and prohibitions on coercion
and price discrimination. 5 5 The North Carolina General Assembly acted even
before Congress in passing "An Act to provide for the licensing of Motor Vehicle Dealers, Salesmen, Manufacturers, Distributors, and Factory Representatives" in May 1955.56 No provision for territorial security was enacted,
57
however, until 1973.
Automobile manufacturers challenged the legislation protecting dealers on
constitutional grounds. 58 The manufacturers tried a number of different legal
theories but were largely unsuccessful. 59 Most courts rejected the manufacturers' argument that such statutes violated the due process clause of the United
States Constitution 6° as well as the argument that the statutes represented spebution and curtailment of this right would be inconsistent with the antitrust objectives of
this legislation.
H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1956 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4596,
4603-04; see also Southern Rambler Sales, Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 375 F.2d 932 (5th Cir.
1967) (discussing legislative history), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 832 (1967); Garvin v. American Motors
Sales Corp., 318 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1963) (discussing legislative history of Dealers' Day in Court
Act).
50. Note, supra note 2, at 400.
Many state regulatory schemes begin with a provision setting forth either legislative findings or declarations of public policy. These provisions are included because state legislatures may not use their powers to protect special groups from competition, and legislation
that is not "affected with the public interest" is outside the police power of the state.
Id. But "one must ask whether the public is actually benefitted by these laws." Id. at 401, n,106.
Justice Stevens answers this question in the negative in his dissent in New Motor Vehicle Bd. v.
Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 120 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 42; infra notes
94-95 and accompanying text.
51. Note, supra note 2, at 403.
52. Id. at 403-05.
53. Id. at 405-08.
54. Id. at 408-10. Wisconsin was the first state to adopt a territorial security provision.
Some representatives of dealer associations have charged that the manufacturers have used
and still use another tactic to blunt the effect of the state statutes. If a dealer could not be
cancelled, he could be induced. . .to give up and resign his franchise "voluntarily" by
adding another franchised dealer selling his make in his area. . . . The Wisconsin Automotive Traders Association reacted to this device by successfully proposing an amendment
to the Wisconsin legislation.. . . Dealer associations in other states may push for similar
provisions now that it has been declared constitutional by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin; manufacturers view it with horror.
S. MACAULAY, supra note 46, at 139. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld this provision against
equal protection, interstate commerce, and vagueness challenges in Forest Home Dodge, Inc. v.
Karns, 29 Wis. 2d 78, 138 N.W.2d 214 (1965).
55. Note, supra note 2, at 411.
56. Act of May 25, 1955, ch. 1243, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 1282.
57. See Act of March 16, 1973, ch. 88, § 1-2, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 68, 68-69. That provision
was amended recently. See Act of July 7, 1983, ch. 704, § 7, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 686, 688; infra
notes 102-24 and accompanying text.
58. Note, supra note 2, at 419.
59. Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 1173 (1966).
60. See, eg., Blenke Brothers Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 203 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ind. 1962) (Federal Dealers' Day in Court Act is not arbitrary and is constitutional); Chrysler Corp. v. New Motor
Vehicle Bd., 89 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 153 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1979) (presence of dealers on the New Motor
Vehicle Board did not deprive manufacturers of an unbiased tribunal); Tober Foreign Motors, Inc.
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cial interest legislation and were therefore an improper exercise of the police
61
power.
The United States Supreme Court, in New Motor Vehicle Boardv. Orrin W.
Fox Co., 62 recently upheld a California statute similar to section 20-305(5)
against various challenges, including an attack based on the due process
clause. 63 The main issue before the Court was "whether California may, by rule
or statute, temporarily delay the establishment or relocation of automobile dealerships pending the Board's adjudication of the protests of existing dealers." 64
The Court held that, "[e]ven if the right to franchise had constituted a protected
interest when California enacted the Automobile Franchise Act, California's
Legislature was still constitutionally empowered to enact a general scheme of
business regulation that imposed reasonable restrictions upon the exercise of the
right."6 5s In short, the Court gave a green light to state regulation of franchise
areas for automobile dealers.

Many courts determining the validity of automobile dealer statutes have
considered whether such statutes violate the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution. 66 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cirv. Reiter Oldsmobile, Inc., 376 Mass. 313, 381 N.E.2d 908 (1978) (statute specific enough for due
process); Ford Motor Co. v. Pace, 206 Tenn. 559, 335 S.W.2d 360 (upholding make-up of the
board), appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 444 (1960); General Motors Corp. v. Capitol Chevrolet, 645
S.W.2d 230 (Tenn. 1983) (presence of dealers on board does not violate due process).
But see American Motors Sales Corp. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd., 69 Cal. App. 3d 983, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 594 (1977) (statute requiring that dealers be on the board unconstitutional); Desert ChryslerPlymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 95 Nev. 640, 600 P.2d 1189 (1979) (Nevada statute violates due
process "since appellants were able to obtain a de facto injunction simply by the filing of the action"), cert denied, 445 U.S. 964 (1980).
61. See, eg., E.L. Bowen & Co. v. American Motors Sales, 153 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. Va. 1957)
(Virginia statute upheld because regulation benefits public); Willys Motors, Inc. v. Northwestern
Kaiser-Willys, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 469 (D. Minn. 1956) (Minnesota statute held valid exercise of
police power); Tober Foreign Motors, Inc. v. Reiter Oldsmobiles, Inc., 376 Mass. 313, 381 N.E.2d
908 (1978) (statute was prima facie within government's constitutional reach); Mazda Motors of
Am., Inc. v. Southwestern Motors, Inc., 36 N.C. App. 1, 243 S.E.2d 793 (1978)(statute presumed
constitutional), modified on othergrounds, 296 N.C. 357, 250 S.E.2d 250 (1979); Ford Motor Co. v.
Pace, 206 Tenn. 559, 335 S.W.2d 360 (stating that no case holds such legislation beyond police
power), appealdismissed, 364 U.S. 444 (1960); Forest Home Dodge, Inc. v. Karns, 29 Wis. 2d 78,
138 N.W.2d 214 (1965) (statute presumed constitutional); Kuhl Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 270
Wis. 488, 71 N.W.2d 420 (1955) (if regulation promotes fair dealing, it is legitimate exercise of police
power); see also Superior Motors, Inc. v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 359 F. Supp. 773 (D.S.C. 1973)
(unlikely that statute was valid exercise of police power, but not necessary to decide that issue). But
see General Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp. 381 (D. Colo. 1956) (Colorado statute held unconstitutional because it required licensing of franchised dealers but not independent dealers).
The Georgia Supreme Court believed such provisions exceeded the proper use of police powers.
In General GMC Trucks, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 239 Ga. 373, 377, 237 S.E.2d 194, 197
(1977), the court said, "[W]e view this legislation. . .as purely anti-competitive and thus not 'affected with the public interest' and within the police power of the state." In Georgia Franchise
Practices Comm'n v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 244 Ga. 800, 802, 262 S.E.2d 106, 108 (1979), the court
said, "m71he cited sections violate the due process clause by seeking to regulate an industry not
affected with a public interest.
62. 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
63. Id. at 104.
64. Id. at 106. The Court also considered whether the statute violated the Sherman Act. See
infra note 73-75 and accompanying text (describing the Court's handling of the Sherman Act issue).
65. Orrin, 439 U.S. at 104.
66. The commerce clause of the United States Constitution grants Congress the power "to
regulate commerce. . . among the several states.
...U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. "Thus, when a
state regulation conflicts with federal regulations enacted under the commerce clause, the federal
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cuit recently held that the Virginia statute 67 providing territorial security did
not violate the commerce clause. 68 The court used a three-part test: whether
the statute promoted a legitimate local purpose; whether the statute treated interstate and intrastate commerce even-handedly; and whether the burden im-

69
posed on commerce was excessive when balanced against the state's interest.

Relying on Orrin, the court held that Virginia's statute promoted a legitimate

local purpose.70 The statute did not discriminate between "manufacturers that
produce cars within the state and those that do not."' 7 1 Finally, the court held
72
that the statute did not unduly burden interstate commerce.

Territorial security statutes also have survived antitrust challenges based on
74

the Sherman Act.73 The antitrust laws are intended to preserve competition.
The Supreme Court in Orrin settled-or perhaps circumvented-the Sherman

Act question in short order by finding the California dealer statute immune from
Sherman Act scrutiny:
The dispositive answer is that the Automobile Franchise Act's regulatory scheme is a system of regulation, clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed, designed to displace unfettered business freedom in
the matter of the establishment and relocation of automobile dealerships. The regulation is therefore outside the reach of the antitrust
laws under the "state action" exemption. 75
statute controls pursuant to the Supremacy Clause." J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTr=trTONAL LAW 266 (2d ed. 1983).
See American Motors Sales Corp. v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 592 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1979)
(Virginia statute regulating number of new franchises did not violate commerce clause), rev'g 445 F.
Supp. 902 (E.D. Va. 1978); Chrysler Corp. v. New Motor Vehicle Board, 89 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 153
Cal. Rptr. 135 (1979) (statute did not violate the commerce clause); Tober Foreign Motors, Inc. v.
Reiter Oldsmobile, Inc., 376 Mass. 313, 381 N.E.2d 908 (1978) (statute valid under the commerce
clause); Ford Motor Co. v. Pace, 206 Tenn. 559, 335 S.W.2d 360 (statute constitutional notwithstanding the commerce clause), appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 444 (1960); Forest Home Dodge, Inc. v.
Karns, 29 Wis. 2d 78, 138 N.W.2d 214 (1965) (statute does not violate the commerce clause).
But see General GMC Trucks, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 239 Ga. 373, 237 S.E.2d 194
(1977) (statute violates commerce clause).
67. VA. CODE § 46.1-547(d) (1980).
68. American Motors Sales Corp. v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 592 F.2d 219, 223 (4th Cir.
1978).
69. Id. at 222. "[Ain important factor in analyzing all such cases attacking state regulation
affecting interstate commerce is not only whether as an absolute matter the burden on interstate
commerce is substantial but in addition whether the burden imposed on such commerce is discriminating in favor of local concerns." J.NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 66, at 277.
70. American Motors Sales v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 592 F.2d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 1978).
The court found support for this proposition in a footnote in Orrin, which stated, "For a helpful
discussion of the purpose served by such laws-the promotion of fair dealing and protection of small
business-see ForestHome Dodge, Inc . . . ." Orrin, 439 U.S. at 102 n.7.
71. American Motors Sales v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 592 F.2d 219, 223 (4th Cir. 1978).
72. Id.at 224. Note that in General GMC Trucks, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 239 Ga. 373,
376, 237 S.E.2d 194, 196 (1977), the Georgia Supreme Court stated, "There can be no question but
that the regulation limiting the available market for General Motors imposes a burden on interstate
commerce."

73. See Tober Foreign Motors, Inc. v. Reiter Oldsmobile, Inc., 376 Mass. 313, 381 N.E.2d 908
(1978) (state action a valid exception to the Sherman Act). The issue was raised in General GMC
Trucks, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 239 Ga. 373, 380, 237 S.E.2d 194, 198 (1977), but the court
failed to reach it.
74. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRuST 20 (1977).
75. Orrin, 439 U.S. at 109.
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The holding that such statutes come under the "state action" exemption complements several cases upholding a manufacturer's right to contract privately for

exclusive dealership arrangements. 76 The statutory schemes establish territorial
security analogous to an exclusive dealership arranged by contract. In either
case, territorial security may be obtained without violating the Sherman Act.
Given manufacturers' general lack of success in challenging these statutes,
the court's decision in Peters is not surprising. In fact, it is consistent with deci-

sions in other jurisdictions. Manufacturers have been so unsuccessful in challenging dealer franchise statutes on federal constitutional and antitrust grounds
that AMC had little choice in Peters but to challenge section 20-305(5) on the
grounds that it violated the antimonopoly provision of the North Carolina Constitution. Orrin prevented any due process or Sherman Act challenges, 77 and
the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit up-

holding a similar Virginia statute suggested that a commerce clause claim would
not be successful. 78 The argument that the general assembly exceeded its police
powers was unattractive because the introductory paragraph to the Motor Vehicle Dealers and Manufacturers Licensing Law affirmatively declares a public
interest in regulating the relationship, 79 and Mazda Motors v. Southwestern Motors80 had indicated that the courts probably would not ignore the general as-

sembly's declaration of public interest.81
AMC's argument that the statute violated the antimonopolies clause was
the only avenue unresolved by a court of authority. The supreme courts of
Georgia and Tennessee had reached contrary conclusions on whether the dealer
statutes sanctioned unconstitutional monopolies. In Georgia FranchisePractices
76. See Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that
reasonableness of vertical restraints of trade depends on whether effect is anticompetitive), cert denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977); Schwing Motor Co., v. Hudson Sales Corp., 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956)
(holding that the Sherman Act did not destroy the common-law right to choose dealers), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957); Kapiolani Motors, Ltd. v. General Motors Corp., 300 F. Supp. 784 (D.C.
Hawaii 1969) (granting motion to dismiss antitrust claim).
Courts generally state that exclusive arrangements create "a monopoly only in the manufacturer's brand of a product, and not in the product itself." Annot., 9 L. ED. 2d 1235, 1237 (1963).
See generally Aycock, supra note 33, at 237-38 (describing the exclusive selling arrangement); Note,
supra note 33 (discussing vertical territorial restrictions); 9 N.C. INDEX 3D Monopolies § 2.2 (1977)
(auto manufacturer may execute contracts giving dealers exclusive rights); 54 Am. JUR. 2d Monopolies § 74 (1971) (vertical restrictions as to sales territories are not per se violations of the Sherman
Act).
H. BROWN, FRANCHIsING REALITIES AND REMEDIES 311 (2d ed. 1978) states:
Where the franchisor is only in a vertical position with its franchisees, the present rule
appears to be that, in the absence of other anticompetitive practices, a franchisor may grant
its dealers exclusive territories for products or services which are in free and open competition with those of a similar kind.
77. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
79. N.C. GEN STAT. § 20-285 (1983); see supra note 42.
80. 36 N.C. App. 1, 243 S.E.2d 793 (1978), modified on other grounds, 296 N.C. 357, 250
S.E.2d 250 (1979).
81. "Additionally, the presumption is that the judgment of the General Assembly is correct and
constitutional, and a statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless the conclusion is so clear
that no reasonable doubt can arise." Id at 7, 243 S.E.2d at 798; see also supra note 61 and accompanying text (citing cases upholding similar statutes in the face of police power challenges).
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v. Massey-Ferguson,82 the Georgia Supreme Court held that certain sections of
the Georgia Franchise Practices Act 83 violated a provision of the Georgia Constitution "declaring illegal all contracts and agreements that may have the effect
or be intended to have the effect to defeat or lessen competition, or to encourage
monopoly."' 84 The Tennessee Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion
in GeneralMotors Corp. v. Capital Chevrolet Co.,85 holding that the territorial
security statute86 did not violate the state constitutional prohibition against mo-

nopolies. 87 Armed with little better than that split in decisions, AMC brought

88
the state constitutional issue before the North Carolina Supreme Court.
In holding section 20-305(5) to be constitutional on its face, the court focused on three points. First, the court determined that the statute represented a
"valid exercise of the state's extensive police power . ... "89 Second, the court

distinguished between impermissible horizontal and permissible vertical restraints on trade. 90 The court characterized section 20-305(5) as a vertical re-

straint, whereas the cases relied on by AMC involved illegal horizontal
restraints. 9 1 "Vertical restraints," the court said, "do not in and of themselves,

result in monopolies."192 Last, the court emphasized
the public policy in favor of
93
regulating the establishment of new franchises.

Justice Stevens, dissenting in Orrin, noted a weakness in the determination
that dealer monopoly statutes are a valid exercise of the state's police power:
The conclusion that there is no state policy against new dealerships is

further confirmed by the statutory limitation on the persons who have
standing to object to a proposed new opening. Most significantly, no
public agency has any independent right to initiate an objection, to
82. 244 Ga. 800, 262 S.E.2d 106 (1979).
83. Act of April 25, 1979, No. 671, §§ 1, 3, 1979 Ga. Laws 1625, 1626-28.
84. GeorgiaFranchisePractices, 244 Ga. at 801, 262 S.E.2d at 107.
85. 645 S.W.2d 230 (Tenn. 1983).
86. TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-17-114(c)(17) (Supp. 1983):
(c) [Tihe commission may deny an application for a license or revoke or suspend the license of a manufacturer. . . who:
(17) Has competed with a dealer in the same line-make operating under an
agreement or franchise from a manufacturer or distributor in the relevant market
area.
This provision is similar to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-305(5) (1983). See infra note 116.
87. Capital Chevrolet Co., 645 S.W.2d at 238. The Tennesee Supreme Court stated: "We find
no merit whatever in the suggestion of General Motors that the statutes in question purport to create
a monopoly and do not consider that the matter warrants extended discussion." Id.
The Tennessee Constitution states, "Monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state."
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 22.
88. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
89. Peters, 311 N.C. at 320, 317 S.E.2d at 358. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
91. Peters, 311 N.C. at 320, 317 S.E.2d at 358. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
92. Peters, 311 N.C. at 320, 217 S.E.2d at 358. The court, quoting United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn, & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvannia, Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977), stated that "'if nothing more is involved than vertical "confinement" of the
manufacturer's own sales of the merchandise to selected dealers, and if competitive products are
readily available to others,. . .' then no monopoly results." Peters, 311 N.C. at 320, 317 S.E.2d at
358 (quoting Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 376). See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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schedule a hearing, or to prohibit such a charge. Nor does any member of the consuming public have standing to complain. 94
The majority in Orrin, however, was not impressed with this argument, 95 and
the North Carolina court did not consider it. Nonetheless, it is contradictory to
declare that the public needs protection by way of the state's police power, but
to deny the consuming public standing to complain.
The Peters court's analysis is also weak in that, to distinguish the two cases
relied on by AMC, the court had to rely on antitrust law. The cases could have
been distinguished more easily from Peters: both involved statutes enacted in
excess of the legislature's police power. 96 Since the court established that section
20-305(5) was a valid exercise of police power, these cases were not persuasive.
Furthermore, in each of these cases, the discussion of the antimonopolies clause
was merely tangential to the outcome.
The most troubling weakness in the court's analysis is that in emphasizing
the public policy in favor of regulating the establishment of new franchises, 97 the
court failed to note the public policy arguments against such statutory protection of dealers. There is evidence that territorial protection results in "a large
wealth transfer from consumers to dealers and a reduction in the volume of newvehicle sales." 98 Furthermore, "[i]n growing markets this restriction will lead to
substantial increases in the market power of existing dealers." 99 It also can be
argued that protection for existing dealers comes at the expense of future dealers. 100 New dealers must make significant capital investments in the early stages
of the franchise. 10 1 If actual operation of franchises is delayed a long time, new
investors will be discouraged from entering the industry, because few can afford
to tie up large amounts of capital awaiting administrative action. Clearly, some
public policy arguments cut against legislated territorial restraints on automobile franchises. Even if these arguments were not strong enough to mandate a
94. Orrin, 439 U.S. 96, 120 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 50.
95. Orrin, 439 U.S. 96, 106-07 (1978).
96. In In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 282 N.C. 542, 551, 193 S.E.2d 729,
735 (1973), the court said of the police power: "[w]e find no such reasonable relation between the
denial of the right of a person, association or corporation to construct and operate upon his or its
own property, with his or its own funds, an adequately staffed and equipped hospital and the promotion of public health." In State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 770, 51 S.E.2d 731, 735 (1949), the court
said: "[I]n consequence, a statute which prevents any person from engaging in any legitimate business, occupation, or trade cannot be sustained as a valid exercise of the police power unless the
promotion or protection of the public health, morals, order, or safety, or the general welfare makes it
reasonably necessary."
97. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
98. Smith, supra note 1, at 154.
99. Smith, supra note 1, at 138.
100. Justice Stevens stated in his Orrin dissent:
By the same token, the legislative judgment that manufacturers have greater bargaining
power than dealers and may have sometimes used it abusively by threatening to overload
dealers' markets with intrabrand competition does not provide a justification for a statutory procedure that deprives all manufacturers and all new dealers of their liberty and
property without due process.
Orrin, 439 U.S. 96, 116 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. Brown & Conwill, Automobile Manufacturer-DealerLegislation, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 219,
387 (1957).
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different conclusion, they should have been mentioned to indicate possible limits
to the territorial protections that the court would accept.
The Peters court upheld section 20-305(5), giving automobile dealers a commanding position with respect to both manufacturers and consumers. In 1983
the general assembly amended section 20-305(5) to increase the dealers' already
superior position. 10 2 The significant additions are: (1) a definition of the relevant market area;10 3 (2) an increase in the time limits for administrative hearings; (3) a provision regulating the relocation of existing dealers; and (4) a listing
of standards to be considered in deciding whether a new franchise is justified.
The net effect of these changes, along with the North Carolina Supreme Court's
holding that the concept of statutory territorial security is constitutional on its
face, exacerbates problems for the consumer.
As originally enacted, section 20-305(5) regulated a manufacturer's efforts
to "grant an additional franchise for a particular line-make of motor vehicle in a
trade area already served by a dealer or dealers in that line-make . ..

."104

"Trade area" was defined simply as "those areas specified in the franchise agreement or determined by the Motor Vehicle Dealers' Advisory Board." 105 Section
20-305(5) as amended uses the term "relevant market area," 10 6 which is defined
as an area within a ten, fifteen, or twenty mile radius of the existing dealer; the
distance of the radius is to be determined by the population of that area. 10 7 The
population criterion, however, is vague,108 and one could argue that a twenty
mile radius is too protective of dealers in rural areas. Nevertheless, considering
that the trade area in Peters included an area larger than the statute's twenty
mile radius area, 1°9 the court can be expected to uphold this portion of the
statute.
The most disturbing change in section 20-305(5) is the new time frame for
administrative procedures under the Act. 10 Section 20-305(5) requires a manufacturer to notify existing dealers and the Commissioner of plans to establish a
new dealership in the relevant market area.I 1 Existing dealers in the same line112
make then have thirty days in which to file a protest with the Commissioner.
"The Commissioner must conduct the hearing and render his final determination. . . no later than 180 days after a protest is filed." 113 Thus, an existing
dealer effectively can block the establishment of a new dealership for up to 210
102. Act of July 7, 1983, ch. 704, § 7, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 686, 688-89.
103. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-286(13)(b) (1983).
104. Id. § 20-305(5) (1978).
105. Id.
106. Id. § 20-305(5) (1983).
107. Id. § 20-286(13)(b).
108. One problem is readily identifiable: For a dealership near a state boundary, does the population count include census tracts outside the state?
109. Peters, 311 N.C. at 313 n.2, 317 S.E.2d at 354 n.2.
110. As originally enacted, the only time requirement was that an existing dealer file a complaint

with the Commissioner within 30 days of receiving notice from the franchisor that a new dealership
was planned. Act of March 16, 1973, ch. 88, § 2, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 68, 68.
111. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-305(5) (1983).
112. Id.
113. Id. § 20-305(5)(c) (1983).
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days' 14-arguably an excessive waiting period. 115
The amended version of section 20-305(5) also regulates the relocation of an

existing dealer in the relevant market area of another existing dealer of the same
line-make. The original statute regulated only the granting of "an additional

franchise for a particular line-make ....-116 The new provision will discourage dealers from relocating, even though population shifts and neighborhood
changes might make such a change beneficial.' 17 This reluctance to relocate
could affect consumers adversely because they might have to return to decaying
neighborhoods after the sale to have their autos serviced.
Finally, section 20-305(5) as amended provides a list, which is not exclusive, 118 of criteria to be used in "determining whether good cause has been established for not entering into or relocating an additional. . . dealer for the
same line-make. . . ."119 The original act required only "reasonable evidence
that after the grant of the new franchise, the market will not support all of the
dealerships in that line-make in the trade area."120 Several of the listed criteria
encompass the effect of a new franchise on consumers' 2 1 and thus, this addition
is a welcome change. The final criterion is "[tihe effect on the relocating dealer

of a denial of its relocation into the relevant market area." 12 2 This provision, if
considered carefully, might alleviate the negative effects of the new provision
regulating relocation and dispel some of the reluctance to relocate that the new
regulation could engender.

The net result of the amendment of section 20-305(5) is to entrench further
the existing dealers, at the expense of the consuming public and prospective

franchisees. Consumers will pay higher prices for new automobiles and receive
less service than desired after purchase.' 2 3 The entrenched dealers now have no
114. Furthermore, any party to the hearing "shall have a right of review of the decision in a
court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to Chapter 105A of the General Statutes." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-305(5)(d) (1983). Thus, a protesting dealer could block establishment of a new dealership for far longer than 210 days.
115. The Court in Orrin faced a similar statute. The California statute has a time frame of 90
days; however, a 90 day extension can be granted on a showing of good cause. CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 3066 (West Supp. 1978). The Court did not discuss the possibility that 180 days was an excessive
waiting period for the new dealership.
116. Act of March 16, 1973, ch. 88, § 2, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 68, 68-69. The amended version
regulates manufacturers "establishing an additional new motor vehicle dealer or relocating an existing new motor vehicle dealer into a relevant market area where the same line make is then represented." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-305(5) (1983).
117. See S. MACAULAY, supra note 45, at 172:
[A]s the population of a city moves to the suburbs, .. some older dealerships lose their
customers and find themselves in undesirable locations. The solution is obvious and expensive: move the location of the dealership and build new facilities.

Id.
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-305(5)(b) (1983).
119. Id.
120. Id. § 20-305(5) (1978).
121. The statutes consumer-oriented criteria include the following: "effect on the consuming
public"; "[w]hether it is injurious or beneficial to the public welfare for an additional new motor
vehicle dealer to be established"; "[w]hether. . .dealers. . . are providing adequate competition
and convenient customer care"; and "[w]hether [the relocated franchise]. . . would increase competition in a manner such as to be in the long-term public interest." Id. § 20-305(5)(b)(3-6) (1983).
122. Id. § 20-305(5)(b)(7) (1983).
123. One writer stated, "Automobile consumers are not an organized interest group, and they
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motivation to offer competitive prices within their line-make or to provide qual-

ity service after sales. It is ironic that the purported justification for these adverse effects on consumers is to protect "the investments and priorities of the
citizens of this State." 124
The North Carolina Supreme Court correctly answered the constitutional

questions before it in American Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters.'25 The court's decision, along with the recent United States Supreme Court decision in New Motor

Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 126 and the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in American Motors Sales Corp. v. Division ofMotor Vehicles, 127 firmly establishes that statutes providing existing dealers with territorial security will be upheld, at least against challenges that the
statutes violate antimonopoly clauses, the due process clause, the commerce

clause, or federal antitrust legislation. Although the court correctly held section
20-305(5) constitutional, the court should have discussed the statute's adverse

effect on consumers. By discussing only the manufacturers' disproportionate
bargaining power, 128 the court failed to counter the dealers' erroneous assertion

that such legislation is unqualifiedly for the public good. So far, consumers of
new automobiles have not organized themselves politically 129 and have failed to

object loudly enough to prevent legislation that benefits dealers at the expense of
the buying public. Peters proves that relief cannot come from the courts; if consumers want healthy competition to determine new automobile prices and the
quality of service after the sale, they should target section 20-305(5) for
130
repeal.
CHARLES NOEL ANDERSON, JR.

could be the ones to pay the price of some types of accomodation between dealers and manufacturers
in the form of higher prices, poorer products, and less reliable service." S, MACAULAY, supra note
46, at 181. A Raleigh, North Carolina, newspaper editor sounded the same concern:
The prime effect of [the] bill would be to entrench dealers and even extend their trade
areas. Anybody who believes this will work to the benefit of the average car buyer should
be checked for missing sparkplugs. The so-called model law of the National Automobile
Dealers Association should be junked.
The News and Observer, June 1, 1983, at A4, col. 1. A Greensboro editorialist stated, "North
Carolina doesn't need to set up further special protection for its auto dealers. The General Assembly
ought to have this bill towed to thejunkyard. It's just another legislative lemon." Greensboro Daily
News, June 4, 1983, at 4, col. 1.
124. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-285 (1983). See supra note 42.
125. 311 N.C. 311, 317 S.E.2d 351 (1984).
126. 439 U.S. 96 (1978). See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
127. 592 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1978). See supra notes 67-72 arid accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
129. "As to why consumers have tacitly permitted themselves to be taxed for the benefit of
dealers, the answer must lie in the cost of learning about the transfer, and then organizing an effective political coalition to deal with it." Smith, supra note 1, at 154.
130. Repeal of section 20-305(5) would not leave dealers without protection from manufacturers
that abuse their superior bargaining power. Section 20-305(6) regulates the termination of existing
dealers. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-305(6) (1983). Furthermore, dealers injured by a manufacturer who
fails to act in "good faith" may bring a federal cause of action. 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1976). See supra
note 48.

